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INTRODUCTION
To say that European Community ("EC") law has direct effect
means that individuals can, under certain conditions, assert EC law be-
fore national courts in order to invoke their Community rights.' The
* Kalamazoo College, B.A. cur laude 1997; University of Michigan Law School, J.D.
2000. Many thanks to Professors Daniel Halberstam and Robert Howse who reviewed and
commented on this Note.
I. In 1963, the Court decided Van Gend & Loos in which it established the notion of
direct effect. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
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European Court of Justice (the "ECJ" or the "Court") first developed the
concept of direct effect in Van Gend & Loos.2 Van Gend & Loos gave
individuals3 the power to directly invoke EC law in the form of Treaty
Articles against a Member State in national courts Thereafter, the ECJ
expanded the doctrine of direct effect by confirming that EC regulations
are directly effective and also by establishing the direct effect of deci-
sions and directives.6 It became an accepted principle that directives,
regulations, decisions and Treaty Articles are directly effective, at least
against Member States. In other words, individuals can assert these four
forms of EC law in national courts directly against Member States; this
concept is known as vertical direct effect. Decisions, Treaty Articles and
regulations can also be invoked directly by an individual in a national
court against other individuals-i.e., they have horizontal direct effect.
1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). In Van Gend & Loos, the Van Gend & Loos
company had imported chemical substances from Germany into the Netherlands. The com-
pany was charged by Customs and Excise with an import duty which the company alleged
had been increased since the time of coming into force of the EEC Treaty, contrary to Article
12 of the EEC Treaty. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March
25, 1957, art. 12 (now art. 25), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The payment of
the duty was appealed before the Dutch Tariefcommissie and the appellant raised Article 12
in its argument. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 17. The Tariefcommissie then referred two
questions to the ECJ, one of which was whether nationals of a Member State can, on the
basis of Article 12, lay claim to individual rights which must be protected by the courts. Id.
The ECJ concluded that "[i]ndependently of the legislation of Member States, Community
law ... not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them
rights which become part of their legal heritage." Id. at 12.
. 2. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 16. Although the concept of direct effect was es-
tablished in Van Gend & Loos, the notion of direct applicability originates in Article 249 of
the EC Treaty (ex art. 189). TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Notably, there is some debate as to
whether these are in fact two separate concepts. See, e.g., J. Steiner, Direct Applicability in
EEC Law-A Chameleon Concept, 98 LAW Q. REV. 229 (1982); J.A. Winter, DirectApplica-
bility and Direct Effect Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 425 (1972). For the purposes of this Note, when "ex art." appears in parenthe-
ses after a citation to an EC Treaty Article, this reference is to the former Article as it
appeared in the EEC Treaty.
3. "Individual" denotes humans as well as legal entities like corporations.
4. Under EC law, Treaty Articles are a form of primary legislation, whereas regula-
tions, directives and decisions are forms of secondary legislation, established by Article 249
of the EC Treaty. See EC TREATY art. 249 (ex art. 189).
5. "Member State" denotes every country that has signed on to the EC Treaty.
6. See Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, 1973 E.C.R. 101, [1973] 3 C.M.L.R. 439
(1973) (confirming the direct applicability of regulations as established by Article 249 of the
EC Treaty); Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, [1971]
C.M.L.R. I (1971) (establishing the direct effect of decisions); Van Gend & Loos, 1963
E.C.R. I (establishing the direct effect of directives). Notably, a directive can only be directly
effective if the Member State in question has seriously mis-implemented the directive into
national law or if it has failed to implement the directive altogether. See Cases C-6/90 & C-
9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,1-5408, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1991).
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The Court has resisted establishing horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives, however, a decision that has limited the potency of EC law. For
example, the Court has stated that directives are only binding on the
Member State to whom they are addressed and therefore they cannot be
used against individuals or non-state entities.7 However, considering that
Treaty Articles are also addressed to Member States only and the Court
has interpreted Treaty Articles to be directly effective against individuals
and non-Member State entities, the Court's reasoning is somewhat dis-
ingenuous. Additionally, it has been argued that there cannot be
horizontal direct effect for directives, because individuals do not have
notice of directives.8 However, most directives are now required to be
published in the Official Journal, a fact which renders this argument
without merit.9 These less-than-convincing positions taken by the Court
indicate a reluctance by the Court to make directives as effective as
other forms of EC law.
Under current EC case law, an individual who is wronged due to an
unimplemented or seriously mis-implemented EC directive has a cause
of action if the perpetrator is a Member State, but does not have a cause
of action if the perpetrator is an individual or a non-state entity. In this
way, the lack of horizontal direct effect for directives makes EC law less
powerful because it limits access to potential defendants and arbitrarily
leaves some plaintiffs without a cause of action.
The purpose of this Note is to investigate the European Court of
Justice's less expansive treatment of directives as compared to other
forms of EC law through its failure to apply horizontal direct effect to
directives. More specifically, this Note attempts to answer two questions
which arise from the current status of ECJ jurisprudence: First, why has
the Court been reluctant to implement horizontal direct effect for
7. See Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, 749, 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986). Helen Marshall, an employee of the
Health Authority, was dismissed in 1980 on the ground that she had passed the normal age of
retirement applicable to women. Under the Authority's written policy, female employees
were to retire at age 60 and male employees at 65. Under national legislation, women be-
came eligible for a state pension at 60, whereas men did not become eligible until the age of
65. However, the national legislation did not impose any obligation on women to retire at 60,
because payment of the state or occupational pension would be deferred until actual retire-
ment. Ms. Hampton brought a case before the Industrial Tribunal complaining that her
dismissal violated the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive. The Court held that the binding na-
ture of a directive exists only as against the state or states to which it is addressed and
therefore could be used by Ms. Marshall as against the Health Authority only insofar as it
was an emanation of the state.
8. See id. at 735 (Opinion of Advocate General Slynn); see also Jason Coppel, Rights,
Duties and the End of Marshall, 57 MOD. L. REV. 859, 876 (1994) (noting that the legal
certainty argument is weakened by reforms to Article 191 (now Article 254) which now make
it obligatory for most directives to be published in the Official Journal).
9. See EC TREATY art. 254 (ex art. 191).
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directives, especially in light of other actions it has taken to increase the
potency of EC law? Second, given the alternative steps taken by the
ECJ, is it still necessary to establish horizontal direct effect for
directives in order to maximize the effectiveness of EC law? There are
various possible explanations for the Court's reluctance to establish
horizontal direct effect for directives, but only one outcome of this
reluctance; namely, less-than-maximum effectiveness of EC law. The
Court's failure to establish horizontal direct effect of directives has
caused a gap in the potency of EC law which the Court has
unsuccessfully attempted to fill through the implementation of
alternative measures. Thus, horizontal direct effect for directives needs
to be established by the Court in order to fill this gap and maximize the
effectiveness of EC law.
Section I of this Note explains the legal difference between direc-
tives, regulations, decisions and Treaty Articles and discusses the
evolution of the doctrine of direct effect. Subsection I-A discusses the
ECJ's development of the doctrine of direct effect and how it has ex-
panded over time to maximize the potency of EC law. Thereafter,
Subsection I-B discusses the Court's decision to put a limit on this ex-
pansion of the effectiveness of EC law.
Next, section II describes the steps the Court has already taken to
make directives more powerful through techniques such as expanding
the definition of a state and creating indirect effect. It also attempts to
explain why the Court has been reluctant to implement horizontal direct
effect for directives and analyzes whether horizontal direct effect for
directives is still necessary considering the steps the Court has already
taken to enhance the potency of EC law. Finally, this Note concludes by
proposing that the effectiveness of EC law will not be maximized until
horizontal direct effect for directives is established.
I. THE ECJ's STEPS TOWARDS MAKING EC LAW EFFECTIVE,
INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT STEP IT HAS FAILED To TAKE
Although the ECJ does not at all times strictly adhere to the wording
of the EC Treaty ("EC Treaty") in its decisions, the Court's differing
treatment of EC Treaty provisions, regulations, and decisions from di-
rectives seems to stem from the power granted to each of these forms of
legislation by the language of the EC Treaty. To begin with, the EC
Treaty does not spell out who is bound by Treaty Articles or to what ex-
tent Treaty Articles are binding.'0 Secondary legislation, like directives
and regulations, on the other hand, is provided for by Article 249 of the
10. See MARGOT HORSPOOL, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 133 (1998).
[Vol. 22:457
The Effectiveness of European Community Law
EC Treaty." Article 249 states that a decision is "binding in its entirety
upon those to whom it is addressed," but no mention is made in the EC
Treaty as to the direct applicability of decisions.' 2 The EC Treaty also
contrasts a regulation, which "shall be binding in its entirety and di-
rectly applicable in all Member States" with a directive, which "shall be
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods."'3 This difference in the Treaty's language
has been interpreted by the Court to require the national implementation
of directives by Member States, while allowing regulations to be incor-
porated directly into national law without requiring any extra measures
for implementation.1
4
Given the language of Article 249, it is not surprising that the Court
has been much more reluctant to give direct effect to directives than to
regulations and decisions. 5 It takes some manipulation of the wording
of the EC Treaty to argue that directives should have direct effect, espe-
cially considering that directives leave implementation up to Member
States and are therefore necessarily less specific than regulations. Since
Member States have substantial leeway in implementing directives, it is
difficult to enforce a directive as presented by the EC-i.e., if it is not
implemented by the Member State. Also, if the Member State has taken
steps to implement the directive, it is difficult to challenge the proper
implementation of the directive when the Member State alone has the
flexibility to implement the directive as to its form and methods. The
ECJ faced these two issues when it expanded the doctrine of vertical
direct effect to apply to directives.
Subsection I-A discusses the ECJ's development of the doctrine of
direct effect and how it has expanded over time to maximize the potency
11. EC TREATY art. 249 (ex art. 189).
12. Id. This Note focuses primarily on the distinction between regulations and direc-
tives, because decisions tend to have a narrower scope since they are enforceable upon the
people to whom they are addressed only. Therefore, it is often more useful and interesting to
compare directives and regulations only so as to figure out why the Court draws the lines it
does in deciding the cases before it.
13. Id.
14. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 186 (2d ed. 1998).
15. Regulations are not necessarily given direct effect by the EC Treaty as the doctrine
of direct effect is now understood, because it is possible for regulations to require further
legislation by the Member States. They are, however, automatically valid in the Member
States. See HORSPOOL, supra note 10, at 134; see also Paul P. Craig, Directives: Direct Effect,
Indirect Effect and the Construction of National Legislation, 22 EUR. L. REV. 519 (1997)
("the reluctance to admit that directives can have direct effect is also in part because while
Article 189 [now art. 249] states that regulations are directly applicable, this phraseology is
not used in relation to directives" (emphasis added)).
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of EC law. Thereafter, Subsection I-B discusses the Court's decision to
put a limit on this expansion of the effectiveness of EC law.
A. The Court's Establishment and Expansion
of the Direct Effect Doctrine
As stated earlier, the Court originally developed the doctrine of di-
rect effect with respect to Treaty Articles. In Van Gend & Loos, the ECJ
held that under Article 12 (now Article 25) nationals of a Member State
can claim individual rights which the domestic courts must protect. 
6
The Court took a teleological approach to the case, concluding that "the
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights ... and
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals."'7 The Court did not conclude that all Treaty articles are di-
rectly effective. Rather, a Treaty provision which is capable of direct
application must be "clear, negative, unconditional, containing no reser-
vation on the part of the Member State, and not dependent on any
national implementing measure."' 8 However, as this Note later discusses
in more detail, "the criteria of precision, unconditionality, and the ab-
sence of a need for further implementing measures have not been
closely adhered to by the Court.'"9
Notably, Van Gend & Loos involved vertical direct effect only; it
concerned an action by an individual asserting EC law against emana-
tions of the state, not against other individuals." The Court first
considered horizontal direct effect, which occurs when EC law is as-
serted in a national court by any individual as against another individual,
16. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1, 7, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
17. See id. at 12. Notably, as this Note will point out, the ECJ has continued to take an
interpretive approach like this in its subsequent cases, although it has put limits on this ap-
proach regarding issues like horizontal direct effect. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14,
at 166.
18. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 168.
19. Id. at 169. The book goes on to cite Defrenne v. Sabena as an example of the Court
relaxing these standards in regard to EEC Treaty Article 119 (now Article 141) which ad-
dressed Member States only. See id. at 171-72 (citing Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe
Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1976), modified,
Case 50/96, Deutsche Telekom v. Schroder, 2000 E.C.R. 1-743 (ruling that the date limita-
tions on direct effect resulting from Defrenne do not apply to a national equal treatment
provision creating retroactive membership in a pension scheme)). In Defrenne, a Belgian
flight attendant brought an action against Sabena, a Belgian airline, claiming she received
less pay than male flight attendants who did the same work. Sabena's practice was in viola-
tion with the "equal pay for equal work" provision contained in EEC Treaty art. 119 (now
Article 141). See Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R. at 457.
20. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 17.
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in Defrenne v. Sabena.2' The Court held that the fact that certain Treaty
Articles are addressed to Member States only "does not prevent rights
from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an
interest in the performance of the duties thus laid down."22
In addition to Treaty Articles, the Court considered the direct effec-
tiveness of decisions, regulations and directives. As to regulations, the
Court confirmed their direct effect was established by Article 249 and
criticized any attempt by a Member State to alter or dilute the require-
ments of a Community regulation. 23 This holding was later narrowed by
Amsterdam Bulb, a case in which the Court indicated that a national
measure to implement a regulation is invalid only if it "alters, obstructs
or obscures the nature of the Community regulation. 24
The Court addressed the direct enforceability of decisions in Franz
Grad.25 Concluding that decisions have direct effect, the ECJ stated that:
"It would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to decisions
... to exclude in principle the possibility that persons affected may in-
voke the obligation imposed by a decision. 26 The Court also concluded
that the obligation imposed by the decision in question was sufficiently
clear, precise and unconditional so as to meet the Van Gend & Loos
standards. Thus, at least some decisions are capable of meeting the Van
Gend & Loos criteria for direct effectiveness. Notably, the question of
horizontal direct effect of regulations and decisions has not been spe-
cifically addressed by the Court. However, decisions, by their very
nature, have direct effect in regard to anyone to whom they are ad-
dressed. Also, regulations, by virtue of being "binding in their entirety,"
have direct effect against any individual or entity that they address.27
The Court's decisions regarding the direct effectiveness of Treaty
provisions, regulations and decisions creates doubts regarding its dis-
course on directives. Van Duyn established the direct effect of
directives.28 In that case, the Court concluded that the possibility of
21. Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R at 455.
22. Id. at 475. Following Defrenne, the Court established the direct effect of various
other Treaty Articles, many of which were held to have vertical as well as horizontal direct
effect. See HORSPOOL, supra note 10, at 136 (referring to EC Treaty Articles 28, 29, 30, 31,
39, 43, 49, 81 and 82 as Treaty provisions which the ECJ has concluded have vertical and
horizontal direct effect.)
23. See Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, 1973 E.C.R. 101, 114, [1973] 3 C.M.L.R. 439
(1973).
24. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 177 (citing Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb
BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1977 E.C.R. 137, 146, 2 C.M.L.R. 218 (1977)).
25. Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, [1971] C.M.L.R.
1 (1971).
26. id. at 837.
27. EC TREATY art. 249 (ex art. 189).
28. See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1 C.M.L.R. I (1975).
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relying on directives directly before national courts cannot be ruled out;
each provision must be examined in context to determine whether the
obligation it imposes or the right it creates is sufficiently clear and con-
cise to be capable of being applied directly by a national couIt. 29 At first
glance, it does not appear that a directive should be capable of meeting
the standards for direct effectiveness set out in Van Gend & Loos,
namely that an EC law provision be clear, precise, unconditional and
independent of any national implementing measure. ° A directive may
leave some discretion to the Member State, it will always require further
implementation according to the explicit terms of Article 249, and it
might not be sufficiently precise to allow for proper national judicial
enforcement.3' In fact, if the Court had adhered to the initial standard set
out in Van Gend & Loos, directives could not be capable of direct effect,
because by their nature they are dependent on national implementing
measures. However, as mentioned earlier, the Court relaxed the Van
Gend & Loos standards over time, which allowed it to conclude in Van
Duyn that directives could have direct effect.32 After Van Duyn, a direc-
tive needs only to impose a clear, precise and complete obligation on a
Member State in order to be directly effective; a Member State may ex-
ercise discretion without eliminating the possibility that the directive be
directly effective as long as the clear, precise and complete criteria are
met.33
The Court's rationale in Van Duyn for concluding that directives can
be directly effective seems to be generally its desire to make directives a
more powerful form of EC law.:4 A more specific line of reasoning was
later added by the Court, namely the estoppel rationale. 5 The estoppel
29. See id. Several questions were presented to the ECJ, including whether direct effect
could apply to Directive 64/221. See id. See also Council Directive 64/221, 1952-67 O.J.
SPEC. ED. (L 850/64) 117.
30. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 186.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 187.
34. See id. at 188 ("What comes through most strongly in Van Duyn is the Court's desire
to make directives an effective form of Community law .... ").
35. See id. at 188-89 (quoting Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, 1979
E.C.R. 1629, 1642, 1 C.M.L.R. 96 (1980) (holding that "a Member State which has not
adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the prescribed periods may
not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obligations which the direc-
tive entails")). The Court also concluded that a directive will only have direct effect at the
end of the prescribed period of implementation and only in the event of a Member State's
default. See id. See also Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-tnnenstadt, 1982 E.C.R.
53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499 (1982) (holding that if difficulties arise in enforcing a sufficiently precise
and clear directive after the end of the implementation period, those difficulties would be the
result of the Member State's failure to implement the directive within the specified period).
Cf Ethel R. Theis, Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness: Emerging Issues on
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rationale is that a Member State cannot rely on its own failure to imple-
ment a directive by refusing to recognize the binding effect of a
directive in a case where it is pleaded against the Member State.3 6 After
the implementation date has expired, the national court must enforce a
directive that it has failed to properly implement if the directive is
pleaded against the Member State, even if it is contrary to existing na-
tional law.37 Under these conditions, directives produce similar effects to
regulations."
B. The Court's Decision to Limit the Expansion
of the Direct Effect Doctrine
So far this Note has discussed actions taken by the ECJ to enhance
the effectiveness of EC law by expanding the doctrine of direct effect to
cover ever more types of EC legislation. Following Van Gend & Loos
and Van Duyn, however, the Court limited this expansion, namely with
its decision in Marshall.39 The case involved a conflict between a local
policy and an EC law directive where the local Health Authority was
acting in accordance with its policy and not the EC directive.' The ECJ
concluded that the direct effect of a directive can only be pleaded by an
individual against the Member State which failed to implement it and
not against a non-state entity or individual who failed to observe it.4' In
other words, directives have vertical direct effect but not horizontal di-
rect effect. 42 The Court reasoned that the binding nature of a directive
exists only in relation to the Member States to which it is addressed. 3
"It follows that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an
Compliance and Effectiveness within the European Union, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
159, 161-62 (1997) (stating that the doctrinal basis for direct effect of directives was not
initially clear, but the Court now relies on an estoppel theory).
36. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 188. As will be discussed infra, this rea-
soning makes little sense in light of the ECJ's more recent case law.
37. See id. at 190.
38. See id. ("Article 249 (old 189) does not declare directives to be directly applicable
•.. but they may produce 'similar effects' to regulations when the time limit for their imple-
mentation has expired and the [Member] State has incorrectly implemented them or has
failed altogether to implement them.").
39. See Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986).
40. See id. As it turned out in Marshall, only vertical direct effect was at issue because
the Court determined that the local Health Authority was a public authority. See id. at 749.
41. Id.
42. The ECJ confirmed its Marshall holding in Faccini Dori v. Recreb, in which Dori
sought to rely on a right contained in a non-implemented directive to resist the enforcement
against her of a contract she had entered into with Recreb. See Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v.
Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1 C.M.L.R. 665 (1995).
43. See Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. at 749.
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individual and that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as
such against such a person."4 This holding is inconsistent with the
Court's ruling in Defrenne v. Sabena that Article 119 (now Article 141)
applies to individuals as well as to Member States, although it was ex-
pressly addressed only to Member States.45 Therefore, it is worth
questioning the viability of the Court's holding that directives do not
have horizontal direct effect.
II. GETTING AROUND THE ECJ's FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT
HORIZONTAL DIRECT EFFECT FOR DIRECTIVES:
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF A MEMBER
STATE, INDIRECT EFFECT AND
FRANCOVICH LIABILITY
As a result of the Court's failure to establish horizontal direct effect
for directives, the Court took an alternative route to enhance the potency
of EC law. This alternative route included: 1) the expansion of the defi-
nition of a Member State, which allows for a larger pool of potential
defendants; 46 2) the development of the principle of indirect effect, under
which Member State courts are required to read domestic legislation in
light of EC law, even if the domestic law was created before the EC law
directive; 47 and 3) Francovich liability, which is the principle that Mem-
ber States can be liable in damages for a breach of EC law, including the
failure to implement or the serious mis-implementation of a directive. 8
44. Id.
45. See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne, 1976
E.C.R. 455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1976), modified, Case 50/96, Deutsche Telekom v. Schroder,
2000 E.C.R. 1-743.
46. See, in chronological order: Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. 723 (concluding that the Health
Authority constituted an organ of the State; therefore, the directive could be enforced against
the Health Authority); Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, 1989
E.C.R. 1839, 3 C.M.L.R. 239 (1989) (concluding that if the directive is of such a nature that
an individual may rely on it as against a Member State, the individual may also rely on it as
against all organs of the administration, including decentralized authorities such as munici-
palities); Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas plc, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313, 2 C.M.L.R. 833
(1990) (holding that an individual can rely on a directive against any body that is responsible
for providing a public service under the control of the State, if such directive could be relied
upon as against the Member State itself).
47. See, in chronological order: Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
1984 E.C.R. 1891, 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1984): Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial
Internacionale de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, I C.M.L.R. 305 (1992).
48. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357. The ECJ held that although the provisions of
the directive were not precise enough for the directive to be directly effective, the directive
nevertheless clearly intended to confer rights of which these individuals had been deprived
through the State's failure to implement it. See id. Notably, Francovich liability applies to
directives that are not otherwise directly effective, as well as to those that are. Although
Francovich concerned a directive that did not have direct effect, Brasserie du Pcheur con-
[Vol. 22:457
The Effectiveness of European Community Law
This Section will describe each of these principles and analyze their im-
pact on the effectiveness of EC law.
A. Expansion of the Definition of Member State
The Court embarked on its expansion of the definition of a Member
State in Marshall 9 In Marshall, both the Advocate General and the ECJ
itself concluded that the Health Authority constituted an organ of the
State; therefore, the claimant in that case could rely on the directive in
question against the Health Authority.50 More generally, the Advocate
General was of the opinion that the term Member State "must be taken
broadly, as including all the organs of the State."'" The ECJ held that it
does not matter in what capacity the Member State is acting. 2 A subse-
quent case broadened the definition of a state even more. In Fratelli
Costanzo, the ECJ concluded that "when the conditions under which the
Court has held that individuals may rely on the provisions of a directive
before the national courts are met, all organs of the administration, in-
cluding decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to
apply those provisions."
The Court furthered this line of reasoning in Foster v. British Gas
where it held that:
[The provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect]
... may be relied upon in a claim for damages against a body,
whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pur-
suant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public
service under the control of the State and has for that purpose
special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules
applicable in relations between individuals.5 4
cluded that Francovich liability extended to directly effective directives as well. See Fran-
covich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5385 (holding that a Member State can be liable in damages to
individuals for failing to give effect to a non-directly effective directive); Case C 46/93,
Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1 C.M.L.R. 889 (1996) (holding
that a Member State can be liable in damages to individuals for failing to give effect to a
directly effective directive).
49. Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. 723.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 735 (Opinion of Advocate General Slynn).
52. See id. at 749.
53. Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, 1989 E.C.R. 1839, 3
C.M.L.R. 239 (1989). The issue in Fratelli Costanzo was whether a municipal authority was
bound by an EC directive if it was determined that the Italian law in question was found to be
incompatible with the directive. The ECJ held that it was so bound. See id.
54. Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas plc, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313, 1-3349, 2 C.M.L.R.
833 (1990). The issue in Foster was whether British Gas-a privatized, yet nationalized in-
dustry with responsibility for and a monopoly of the gas-supply system in Great
Spring 2001]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Although the Court's holding in Foster v. British Gas is expansive, it is
also quite vague. It is unclear after Foster v. British Gas what other bod-
ies and institutions may be held legally responsible when they fail to
comply with unimplemented directives.5 Nevertheless, it is clear that
the ECJ was increasing the number of plaintiffs who could directly in-
voke EC law when a State fails either to implement a directive or to
implement a directive without serious mis-implementation. In other
words, it was looking for one way to fill the gap left by its refusal to
apply horizontal direct effect to directives.
The ruling's ambiguity, however, increases the uncertainty of liabil-
ity for private and public entities alike. 6 In contrast, the establishment of
horizontal direct effect for directives would put individuals and quasi-
public entities on notice of potential liability under EC law, and thereby
eliminate the ambiguity and unpredictability as to whom could be held
liable.
B. The Doctrine of Indirect Effect
At the same time that the Court was expanding the definition of a
Member State, it developed the principle of indirect effect. This princi-
ple requires national law to be interpreted in light of EC directives. "By
urging national courts to read domestic law in such a way as to conform
to the provisions of directives, the Court attempted to ensure that direc-
tives would be given some effect despite the absence of proper domestic
implementation."57 The principle of indirect effect was first established
in Von Colson, where the Court held that "in applying the national law
... national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light
of the wording and the purpose of the Directive.. . ."" Interestingly, the
Britain-was a body of the type against which the provisions of a directive could be invoked.
The Court ruled that it was.
55. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 197.
56. See Gerrit Betlem, Medium Hard Low-Still No Horizontal Direct Effect of Euro-
pean Community Directives After Faccini Dori, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 469, 488 (1995) ("Thus
the concept of public authority in Community law can be seen to have a chameleon charac-
ter: sometimes it is the 'State' and sometimes it is the 'individual.'").
57. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 198.
58. Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891, 1909, 2
C.M.L.R. 430 (1984). The case involves a claim by applicants to a German prison that they
were discriminated against on grounds of sex in violation of the 1976 Equal Treatment Di-
rective. The question was whether the directive required the appointment of the complainants
to a post, because under German law, which purported to implement the directive, the com-
plainants were allowed reliance loss only. (In this case, the reliance loss was reimbursement
of one of the plaintiffs' travelling expenses.) The Court ruled that appointment to a post was
not necessary, but that the directive did require German law to provide an adequate and
effective remedy. See id. at 1907-09.
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directive in question in Von Colson was insufficiently precise to have
direct effect.5 9 Therefore, by requiring the national courts to read the
domestic legislation in light of the directive, the Court gave effect to a
directive that would not otherwise have been enforceable by individuals
as against even a public authority.
The Court expanded upon its Von Colson ruling by holding in a sub-
sequent case that national law must be interpreted in light of an EC
directive whether the national law is enacted before or after the direc-
tive.' In so holding, however, the Court used language which has been
construed by some to limit its Von Colson ruling. 6 The Court stated that
the national court is to interpret the directive "as far as possible" in light
of the wording and purpose of the directive.6" Some argue that this lan-
guage really leaves it entirely within the Member State courts' discretion
whether or not to read the national law in light of the EC directive. 63
Others contend that Marleasing does not require a national court to
override an inconsistent provision of national law in light of a direc-
tive-i.e., "as far as possible" requires that national law be read in light
of a directive only if the directive is consistent with the national law.
4
Yet another interpretation is that it is not clear just what Marleasing re-
quires, because the "as far as possible" language is surrounded by
language implying that the duty to interpret national law in light of a
59. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 199; Eric F Hinton, Strengthening the Ef-
fectiveness of Community Law: Direct Effect, Article 5 EC, and the European Court of
Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 307, 326 (1999) (stating that Von Colson illustrates that
indirect effect applies in cases in which a directive has no direct effect because it fails the
Van Gend & LooslVan Duyn criteria).
60. Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA,
1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, 1-4159, 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992) ("[lun applying national law, whether the
provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, the national court called
upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the
purpose of the directive...."). Marleasing involved two non-state companies in which the
plaintiff company sued the defendant company in order to have the defendant company's
articles of association declared void as having been created for the sole purpose of defraud-
ing and evading creditors, including Marleasing. Under the Spanish Commercial Code, "lack
of cause" is a ground for nullity of articles of association; however, "lack of cause" is not a
ground for nullity under Council Directive 68/151, which should have been implemented by
Spain. Spain had determined that its existing Commercial Code sufficiently implemented the
directive. The Court declared that all Member States have a duty to take all appropriate
measures to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to abstain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of Treaty objectives.
61. See id.; cf Nick Maltby, Marleasing: What Is All The Fuss About?, 109 LAW Q.
REV. 301, 305-07 (1993).
62. Marleasing, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-4159.
63. See Rene Valladares, Francovich: Light at the End of the Marshall Tunnel, 3 U.
MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 32 (1995) ("The principle of indirect effect has been perceived as
being too dependent on the willingness and capacity of the national court to identify its
Community obligations.")
64. See Maltby, supra note 61, at 301, 305; cf Coppel, supra note 8, at 873.
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directive is an absolute obligation.65 Therefore, due to the numerous in-
terpretations that can be gleaned from it, the overall effectiveness of
Marleasing is questionable.
In view of case law following Marleasing, it appears that the most
accurate interpretation of Marleasing out of those suggested above is
that the decision to interpret national law in light of a directive is solely
within national courts' discretion. Cases after Marleasing restricted the
doctrine of indirect effect that it broadened. The ECJ "seemed to leave it
to the discretion of the national court whether or not an interpretation in
conformity with a Directive was possible."66
Also, the Court went so far as to dissuade national courts from in-
terpreting directives in a way that would cause them to have horizontal
direct effect.67 In Luciano Arcaro, the Court recited a national court's
obligation under Marleasing" and concluded that:
[The] ... obligation of the national court to refer to the content
of the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its own
national law reaches a limit where such an interpretation leads
65. See Grainne de Burca, Giving Effect to European Community Directives, 55 MOD. L.
REv. 215, 227 (1992) (stating that the meaning of "as far as possible" is not clear given the
fact that other parts of Marleasing are phrased in terms of an absolute obligation on national
courts to construe domestic law in conformity with directives). The article additionally indi-
cates that if an absolute obligation to read national law in light of a directive is established
by Marleasing, this would obviate the distinction between the national court's obligation to
interpret the directive and the direct enforcement of directives against individuals. It would
do this without addressing the policy concerns the ECJ seems to have with horizontal direct
effect. See id. Such a contention implies that either the Court is being very disingenuous or it
necessarily is not requiring an absolute obligation to interpret national law in light of a direc-
tive.
66. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 203. The book goes on to cite three cases,
Wagner-Miret, Faccini Dori and El Corte Ingles and explains that in each of these cases the
ECJ accepted the limits of interpretation found by the national courts. See id. at 203 (citing
Case C-192/94, El Corte Ingles v. Cristina Blazques Rivero, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1281, 2 C.M.L.R.
507 (1996); Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1 C.M.L.R. 665
(1995); and Case C-334/92, Wagner-Miret v. Fondo de Garantia Salarial, 1993 E.C.R.
1-6911, 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (1995)).
67. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 204. The authors propose that:
[T]he Court can be seen not simply leaving it to national courts to decide how far
they wish to go in interpreting national law in the light of directives, but appar-
ently dissuading them from seeking such a harmonious interpretation where the
end result might be seen as a form of horizontal direct effect.
Id. at 204.
68. The obligation in question here is to interpret national law in light of the EC direc-
tive as far as possible. See Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de
Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992).
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to the imposition on an individual of an obligation laid down by
a directive which has not been transposed .... 69
This conclusion attempts to minimize the potency of the doctrine of in-
direct effect established in Marleas.ing because it explicitly limits
national courts' obligation to read national law in light of EC law.70
However, it is possible to distinguish Luciano Arcaro from Marle's-
ing, because Marleasing concerned a legal disadvantage or detriment. to
a party, whereas Luciano Arcaro discusses the imposition of an obliga-
tion on a party.' Also, Luciano Arcaro may not have as much
precedential weight as Marleasing, considering the decision in that case
was given by a very small chamber of the Court. 2 At a minimum,
Luciano Arcaro and other cases following Marleasing call into question
the continuing strength of indirect effect as an alternative method of
achieving maximum effectiveness of EC law.
In any case, considering that Marleasing involved one individual as-
serting EC law against another individual, indirect effect under
Marleasing is a surrogate for horizontal direct effect for directives.73 It is
at least possible after Marleasing to obtain the results of horizontal di-
rect effect for directives without a formal acceptance of the horizontal
direct effect doctrine by the ECJ. However, since indirect effect is
strictly dependent on the interpretation of the national court in question,
obtaining results that are comparable to the result that would be ob-
tained if horizontal direct effect were applied to directives is at the whim
of the national court. Thus, indirect effect does not fill the gap in the
effectiveness of EC law left by the lack of horizontal direct effect of di-
rectives.
69. C-168/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Luciano Arcaro, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4705,
1-4730, 1 C.M.L.R. 179 (1997).
70. As Craig & de Burca point out, "At first glance, the Court appears to have come full
circle in Luciano Arcaro." CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 205.
71. Id. at 206.
72. See id. at 204.
73. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 489 ("This canon of interpretation functions as a sub-
stitute for horizontal direct effect. In fact the interpretive obligation amounts to a kind of
surrogate horizontal direct effect .... "); Maltby, supra note 61, at 302; cf Hjalte Rasmussen,
Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community Law, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL. F.
135, 145 (1992) ("The result, in Marleasing, is a preliminary ruling which in essence directs
the national courts to recognize the horizontal direct effect of article 11 of the First Company
Law Directive. In this manner, horizontal effects are introduced, so to say, through the back
door.")
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C. Francovich Liability
A third doctrine created by the Court to make EC law more power-
ful, thereby circumventing its rejection of horizontal direct effect for
directives, is Francovich liability." In Francovich, the Court held that the
State could be liable to an individual in damages for loss caused by its
failure to implement a directive.75 Keeping in line with its efforts to
make EC law more effective, the Court concluded that:
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired
and the protection of the rights which they grant would be
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when
their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for
which a Member-State can be held responsible.6
Therefore, instead of attempting to enforce a directive against another
private party in violation of a directive, an individual can seek damages
from the Member State for failure to implement the directive altogether
or for serious mis-implementation.77 In this way, Francovich liability
serves as an alternative to the lack of horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives. As O'Keefe puts it, indirect effect and Francovich liability "allow
individuals to claim remedies based on a directive even in a horizontal
74. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 210.
75. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66
(1991).
76. Id. at 1-5414.
77. "Rather than attempting to enforce the provisions of a directive against the private
party on whom the obligation contained in those provisions should be imposed if it were
properly implemented, the individual can choose instead to bring proceedings for damages
against the State for failing so to implement it." CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 210;
see also Coppel, supra note 8, at 861-62 ("Individuals unable to enforce the terms of an
unimplemented or imperfectly implemented directive horizontally should ... pursue a more
indirect course and seek damages from the state, which was responsible for its implementa-
tion"); Valladares, supra note 63, at 46 (stating that under Francovich an individual is able to
sue a Member State for damages sustained at the hand of another individual due to the non-
implementation of a directive). As stated earlier, Francovich liability applies regardless of
whether the directive does or does not have direct effect. See note 48, supra.
78. See Valladares, supra note 63, at 50 ("While an individual cannot claim rights under
an unimplemented directive against another because of the lack of horizontal direct effect of
directives, Francovich offers the powerful solution of obtaining damages from the real cul-
prit: the Member State which has failed to fulfill its Community obligations."); Ian Ward,
Fairness, Effectiveness and Fundamental Rights: The Case for a Unified Administrative Law
Within The European Community, 5 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 279, 317-18 (1994) (stating that
Francovich "extended private law liability to public law bodies and, in doing so, further
armed the individual in his attempt to effect his rights within a member state").
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situation such as that in Marleasing, thus avoiding the denial of the
remedy established by Marshall L"79
However, Francovich does have its limits. Member State liability is
subject to the fulfillment of various conditions. For example, three con-
ditions must be fulfilled under Francovich in order for liability to attach
to a Member State: 1) the purpose of the directive must be to grant
rights to individuals; 2) it must be possible to identify the content of
those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive; and 3) there
must be a causal link between the breach of the State's obligation and
the damage suffered. 0 Also, Member State liability does not exist for
every kind of infringement of EC obligations, but only for "sufficiently
serious" violations.' As Swaine has argued, "the Court's incorporation
of the requirement that breaches be 'sufficiently serious' will certainly
leave many injured claimants uncompenstated. 82 Although subsequent
cases have helped to make the Francovich criteria less ambiguous,83 the
basic conditions established in Francovich persist. Therefore, the ex-
plicit language of the doctrine itself places limits on its applicability.
In addition, a Member State's breach of an unimplemented directive
is remedied in the absence of a Community rule by applying national
remedies and procedures with respect to Member State liability."4 Since
national rules on Member State liability are unlikely to be uniform, the
79. David O'Keeffe, Judicial Protection of the Individual By The European Court of
Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 901, 905-06 (1996). O'Keeffe's reference to Marshall I is
the same case referred to in this Note as Marshall. There is a counterpart to the Marshall
case concerning damages only, which O'Keeffe addresses in his article and which explains
the distinction he makes between Marshall I and Marshall II. See id.
80. Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5414-15.
81. Id. at 5414.
82. Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court
of Justice, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 80 (2000).
83. See Case C 46/93, Brasserie du P~cheur SA v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1
C.M.L.R. 889 (1996) (establishing factors to be considered to determine a serious breach
under Francovich where transposition of the directive has been imperfect); Joined Cases
C-178-79/94 & C-188-190/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845, 3 C.M.L.R. 469
(1996) (concluding that failure to transpose a directive altogether automatically constitutes a
sufficiently serious breach under Francovich). The factors established by Brasserie du
Pcheur to be considered in determining whether a breach is sufficiently serious include: 1)
the clarity and precision of the rule breached; 2) the measure of discretion left by that rule to
national or Community authorities; 3) whether the infringement and the damage caused was
intentional or involuntary; 4) whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable; 5) the
fact that the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the
omission; and 6) the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to
Community law. See Brasserie du P&heur, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-1150.
84. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5415-16; cf de Burca, supra note 65, at 238 (stat-
ing that Francovich repeats limitations set out in earlier cases, because it requires that the
procedural rules and conditions of the damages remedy: 1) are to be governed by national
law; 2) are to be no less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions; and 3)
should not render an award practically impossible to secure).
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nature and effectiveness of the available remedies for enforcement is
likely to vary from Member State to Member State.85 Therefore,
"[i]nequality and unfairness in the protection of individual rights con-
ferred by Community law is a likely result.
86
Finally, it is important to reconsider the strength of Francovich be-
cause issues may arise, for example, as to whether alternative remedies
like indirect effect under Marleasing must be exhausted by an individual
before she can rely on Francovich remedies.87 Also, considering that the
facts of Francovich are extreme, it is unclear whether the applicability
of the case is limited to those situations where the Member State's mis-
cpnduct is as blatant as it was in Francovich.88 Thus, although some
scholars believe that Francovich fills the entire gap left by Marshall,89
there are legitimate reasons to doubt this conclusion and to support the
application of horizontal direct effect to directives.
III. THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF MAKING
DIRECTIVES HORIZONTALLY DIRECTLY EFFECTIVE
Before considering the arguments for and against the establishment
of horizontal direct effect for directives, it is important to ask why the
Court has been reluctant to establish horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives. Perhaps the ECJ feels constrained by prior case law regarding
direct effect. It may, however, involve some other, extraneous factor. As
stated earlier, the Court could have established horizontal direct effect
for directives following its ruling in Defrenne v. Sabena.° Also, in light
of the expansive nature of case law before and after Marshall-like Van
Gend & Loos in which the Court established vertical direct effect for
Treaty Articles, or Foster v. British Gas in which the Court expanded the
85. See James E. Hanft, Comment: Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy: EEC Member State
Liability for Failure to Implement Community Directives, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1237,
1272 (1991/1992).
86. Id.
87. See Valladares, supra note 469, at 48-51.
88. See id. at 50-51. Considering case law following Francovich, like Dillenkofer, and
Brasserie du P&heur, it appears that this issue is now much clearer than it was at the time of
Valladares's article. However, the fact that the Court has adhered to the "sufficiently serious"
requirement suggests that the breach does have to be relatively serious. Cf Coppel, supra
note 8, at 873-74 (stating that it is unlikely that the Court would settle on a strict liability
standard for Francovich claims). The facts of Francovich are extreme because the Italian
government had already been criticized once for failure to implement the directive in ques-
tion under an Article 226 (ex art. 169) proceeding, but continued to leave the directive
unimplemented. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5371. The Article 226 procedure is de-
scribed later in this Note.
89. See, e.g., Valladares, supra note 63, at 47.
90. Id.
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definition of a Member State-it appears doubtful that the Court really
felt constrained by precedent. 9' Therefore, there must be some other rea-
son for its failure to establish horizontal direct effect for directives.
Various authors have proposed that the reason for the Court's reluc-
tance is political . When vertical direct effect for directives was
established by the Court, it faced much criticism from various Member
States.93 Also, almost all Member States that made submissions in a case
involving the application of horizontal direct effect to directives, Faccini
Dori, opposed establishing horizontal direct effect for directives. 9 Ac-
cording to Craig & de Burca, the Member States' opposition to
horizontal direct effect is based on the assumption that they will have
more discretion in the implementation of directives given to them by EC
Treaty Article 249 if national courts and administrators are not directly
enforcing them.95
To reinforce this possible explanation for the Court's denial of hori-
zontal direct effect for directives, it is "significant to note that, once the
resistance of Member States' courts to the direct effect of directives sub-
sided, the ECJ to some extent proceeded toward recognizing their
horizontal direct effect. 96 Assuming that political motivations have in-
fluenced the Court's reluctance to establish horizontal direct effect for
directives, one must consider whether the situation would ever be such
as to allow for horizontal implementation of the direct effect doctrine on
91. See JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 237-38 (1993) ("In order to affirm verti-
cal direct effect of directives the Court has gone beyond the wording of article 189 [now
Article 249] whilst in order to deny horizontal direct effect of directives it has chosen to
interpret the article in a narrow way."); Coppel, supra note 8, at 863 (stating that it is disin-
genuous for Court to claim lack of basis in Treaty for horizontal direct effect of directives
considering supremacy, vertical and horizontal direct effect of Treaty Articles and vertical
direct effect of directives).
92. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 878 (contending that the real reason for the continuing
denial of horizontal direct effect is a political one); Giorgio Gaja, 1994 Survey of Books Re-
lating to the Law XI. International and Comparative Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1971-72
(1994) (reviewing BENGOETXEA, supra note 91). Notably, Coppel states that another reason
for the Court's denial of horizontal direct effect for directives is that the Commission favors
the retention of current case law. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 878.
93. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 188 (stating that Van Duyn was not a
popular decision and that "some of the Member States felt that the Court had gone too far in
advancing its conception of Community law at the expense of the clear language of the
Treaty, and the obvious limitations on directives as a form of legislation"); Theis, supra note
35, at 162 (contending that the doctrine of direct effect of directives has "been only reluc-
tantly accepted by supreme and constitutional courts, notably in France and Germany, and
has met with mixed reactions from academic commentators").
94. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 211 (citing Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v.
Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1 C.M.L.R. 665 (1995)).
95. Id.
96. See Gaja, supra note 92, at 1971.
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directives. However, given the principles the Court has created to get
around its failure to apply horizontal direct effect to directives subse-
quent to this resistance movement by Member States, like indirect effect
and Francovich liability, the situation most likely will arise so as to al-
low for application of horizontal direct effect to directives.
Subsection I-A analyzes the arguments against horizontal direct ef-
fect for directives and Subsection II-B considers the arguments in favor
of horizontal direct effect for directives.
A. Arguments Against Horizontal Direct Effect for Directives
The ECJ's reluctance to establish horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives does not dismiss the issue of whether horizontal direct effect
should be applied to directives. There are many arguments for and
against giving directives horizontal direct effect.
The first and potentially most convincing argument against the
Court's establishing horizontal direct effect for directives is the need for
judicial restraint. 97 The argument is that if the Court continues to pursue
judicial activism, it will lose all credibility and Member States will not
respect its decisions at all.98 On the one hand, this is a definite concern
considering that the Court's only true enforcement power rests in the
respect it gets from the various Member States. 99 However, when one
considers the "active" approach the Court has taken in its development
of indirect effect, its expansion of the definition of a Member State, and
its creation of Francovich liability, one can only conclude that judicial
restraint is not a reason for its refusal to apply horizontal direct effect to
directives, but rather a pretext for some other underlying issue.' °° For
example, as discussed earlier, the Court may be worried about the resul-
tant political pressure from Member States if it were to make directives
97. See Hinton, supra note 59, at 346-47.
98. See id. ("If national courts and authorities choose not to abide by ECJ judgments, a
greater enforcement problem exists than if the ECJ had not acted at all. A corresponding
reduction in the effectiveness of Community law results."); see also Rasmussen, supra note
73, at 162 ("If the ECJ's legitimacy crumbled under the weight of societally unacceptable
activism, the EC would lose the only institution that throughout the years of declining Mem-
ber State faith in the benefits of 'building Europe,' has steadfastly insisted on strengthening
its still frail construction.").
99. See Hinton, supra note 59, at 346-47 (contending that "the ECJ is only effective if
national courts and authorities are willing to abide by and enforce its decision").
100. See generally, Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial tnternacionale de
Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992); Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90,
Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1991); Case C-188/89, Foster v.
British Gas plc, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313, 2 C.M.L.R. 833 (1990); Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891,2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1984).
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directly effective horizontally.' ° Also, the Court may be resisting the
inevitable infringement on the Member States' historical sovereignty
that is tied up with making directives directly effective horizontally.
Whatever the underlying issue might be, if the Court were truly worried
about taking an overly-activist approach, it would have stopped short of
some of the other measures it has taken. Thus, since the Court has not
stopped short of such measures, judicial restraint must not be the con-
cern behind its reluctance to apply horizontal direct effect to directives.
In fact, one could even argue that by failing to take this final step,
the Court is undermining its own credibility by showing too much def-
erence to Member States; the Court is indicating that it is not willing to
address Member State opposition when it is required. If anything, the
Court's expansive approach suggests that it is absolutely within its
power to establish horizontal direct effect; therefore, applying horizontal
direct effect to directives would not show lack of judicial restraint.' 2
Next, a number of scholars contend that the estoppel argument re-
lied upon by the Court to justify vertical direct effect for directives does
not apply to horizontal direct effect because individuals do not have
power over the implementation of directives.' 3 If it were not for case
law decided subsequent to Marshall, this argument might have some
merit. However, considering that the Court has expanded the definition
of a Member State to include public utilities,'O° for example, this argu-
101. Note that horizontal direct effect does seem to be a sensitive area that is faced with
much resistance by Member States. See, e.g., BENGOETXEA, supra note 91. That said, some
states have gone ahead and taken the initiative to recognize horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives without the establishment thereof by the Court. See Werner F Ebke, European
Community Law in a Nutshell, 15 Hous. J. INT'L L. 237, 241 (1992) (book review) (referring
to an example of such recognition in Germany).
102. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 491 (arguing that the Court could change its mind
about horizontal direct effect because it is not that different from indirect effect which per-
mits the enforcement of directives against private parties and also because of the unclear
language the Court used in Faccini Dori). On a related note, the Court could easily justify
establishment of horizontal direct effect under Article 5. EC TREATY art. 5. Under Article 5,
Member States are required to take all general or particular measures that are appropriate to
fulfill their Community law obligations. EC TREATY art. 5. Importantly, the Court used Arti-
cle 5 to fill the gaps of direct effect in Francovich, concluding that the liability for damages
resulting from a violation of obligations under Community law arises out of both the general
system of the Treaty and Article 5 of the Treaty. Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5411-14.
103. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 481 (1995); Maltby, supra note 61, 310 (stating that
if estoppel is the basis for the adoption of vertical direct effect, it is clear why directives
cannot give rise to horizontal direct effect); Valladares, supra note 63, at 25 (1995) (discuss-
ing the reasons given against horizontal direct effect by Advocate General Slynn in Case
152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R.
723, 734, 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986)).
104. See, e.g., Foster, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-3348.
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ment loses all strength. 0 5 Public utilities do not have any more control
over the implementation of directives than individuals. Concededly,
there is an argument that public utilities, as agents of the state, are con-
structive state actors and should therefore be treated exactly as the
Member State itself is treated.
For example, as a state actor, a public utilities company should not
get away with violating a directive any more than a more traditional
state government entity should. However, when one considers what is
actually entailed in the implementation process of directives and who is
responsible for such process, it is inconsistent to hold a public utility in
the same light as an internal government agency. The public utility sim-
ply does not have the same degree of control over state actions. Because
of this distinction, and since the Court allows directives to be asserted
directly against public utilities, it seems equally inconsistent to draw the
line at public utilities and not allow actions against individuals who vio-
late directives. Therefore, in order to remain consistent, the Court
should either expand the estoppel argument (as discussed in Subsection
II-A, supra) to include horizontal direct effect, or abandon this theory
altogether.,06
A third argument is that there is no basis for horizontal direct effect
for directives in the EC Treaty.' 7 However, the Court has at other times
gone beyond the explicit language of the EC Treaty, so this also cannot
be a reason for refusing to establish horizontal direct effect for direc-
tives. "'
Another argument is one referred to earlier, namely that since direc-
tives require implementation by national courts, they alone do not
provide enough instruction or certainty to allow for direct enforcement
105. See Walter van Gerven, Articles 30, 48, 52 and 59 After Keck & Mithouard, and
Protection of Rights Arising from Directives after Faccini Dori, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 217,
235 (1996) [hereinafter, "Articles"]; Walter van Gerven, The Horizontal Effect of Directive
Provisions Revisited: The Reality of Catchwords, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 335, 344-45 (Deirdre Curtin &
Ton Heukels eds., 1994) [hereinafter, "van Gerven"] (concluding that the Court's estoppel
argument as applied to public utilities that have no control over implementation of directives
suggests that individuals, too, are in a position to have directives enforced against them).
106. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 484 (arguing that the estoppel theory does not work
as a legal basis for horizontal direct effect, so it should either be expanded to include indi-
viduals or abandoned as a basis for any form of direct effect); cf Coppel, supra note 8, at
875 (declaring that the estoppel justification for no horizontal direct effect is no longer vi-
able).
107. Cf Manfred Zuleeg, EC Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 222, 224 (reviewing SACHA
PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: A STUDY OF DIRECTIVES AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT IN NATIONAL COURTS (1995)).
108. For example, the Court did not adhere to a strict reading of the language of the
Treaty when it decided Van Gend & Loos. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 166.
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against individuals.'" In other words, directives are not explicit enough
to make individuals certain of their legal responsibilities or obligations.
This lack of instruction is compounded by the fact that in order for its
direct effect even to be in question, a directive must necessarily be either
seriously mis-implemented or left unimplemented by the Member
State."0 However, Treaty Articles, which tend to lack instruction as well,
have been accorded both vertical and horizontal direct effect by the
Court."' Thus, lack of certainty is at best a questionable argument
against implementation of horizontal direct effect on directives.
In fact, horizontal direct effect for directives may even increase cer-
tainty for individuals against whom EC law is being asserted. For
example, one Advocate General argued that the recognition of horizon-
tal direct effect would not prejudice legal certainty, but rather could only
result in enhanced legal clarification for individuals."2 "In particular he
pointed out that the very broad conceptualization of 'State' for the pur-
pose of direct effect, and the unclear limits of the duty imposed on
national courts to construe their domestic law in conformity with EC
law, have created so much uncertainty that the recognition of horizontal
direct effect could only result in legal clarification for the citizens of the
Union.""' 3 In other words, if the law were that directives could be as-
serted against all individuals in breach of an EC directive, enhanced
clarity would be obtained for individuals against whom the directive is
asserted, because the question of what constitutes a Member State
would no longer be relevant.
109. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 192; Maltby, supra note 61, at 310; cf
Coppel, supra note 8, at 876 (stating that when analyzing their legal position individuals
"would have to refer not only to national laws but also to Community legislation and, more-
over, to come to an independent conclusion as to whether national law faithfully reflected
Community law").
110. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 487.
11. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 192 ("While it is true that there are
problems of legal certainty which could be created by the so-called 'horizontal' application
of directives, these are problems which the Court has surmounted in the case of the direct
effect of other kinds of Community law."); Rasmussen,. supra note 73, at 157 (arguing
against horizontal direct effect, the author states that there are many similarities between
Treaty provisions and directives); Valladares, supra note 63, at 24 (arguing that giving hori-
zontal direct effect to Treaty provisions, but not to directives, results in absurdities).
112. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 486 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in
Case C-316/93, Vaneetveld v. Le Foyer SA, 1994 E.C.R. 1-763, 2 C.M.L.R. 852 (1994)); cf
Valladares, supra note 63, at 27 (quoting Professor Anthony Arnull arguing in regard to Mar-
shall that "the rights of the individual and the requirements of legal certainty would have
been better served had the Court accepted that directives were capable of producing horizon-
tal direct effect"). As used in this Note, "legal certainty" means certainty with regard to legal
rights and obligations.
113. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 486 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in
Vaneetveld).
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A fifth argument related to the lack of legal certainty contention is
that individuals are not put on notice regarding EC directives. ' 4 Since
the reformation of Article 191 (now Article 254), however, most direc-
tives are now required to be published and therefore individuals have at
least formal notice of EC directives." '5 Thus, lack of notice is no longer a
valid argument against horizontal direct effect of directives. This point is
bolstered by the fact that individuals who should be on notice presuma-
bly employ lawyers who are familiar with EC law to keep them
informed of the changing status and implementation of directives. 116
Importantly, there appears to be a general notion of unfairness that
underlies the legal certainty and notice arguments advanced against
horizontal direct effect. For example, it simply seems unfair to saddle
individuals with liability for a Member State's failure to implement a
directive. Although this is a point worth considering, it is not strong
enough to deny wronged individuals the recourse they deserve. After all,
the individuals that would be held liable under a regime in which hori-
zontal direct effect for directives is instituted would not be asked to do
anything more than comply with EC law. It is just that with horizontal
direct effect there would be a missing link, namely the Member State's
proper implementation of the EC directive in question into national law.
If the Member State were to properly implement the EC directive, the
individual would be held liable for breaching the Member State law that
reflects the EC directive. 1 7 However, the fact that the Member State
failed to implement the directive in question would not change the fact
that the directive is binding EC law with which its addressees should
comply. Therefore, considering that individuals have notice of EC law
and there is legal certainty with horizontal direct effect for directives,
this missing link of Member State implementation should not make a
difference, especially in the context of the European Community.
For example, if there were an EC law directive that made drinking
alcohol under the age of 18 illegal, a Member State's failure to imple-
114. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 211; Maltby, supra note 61, at 310.
115. See EC TREATY art. 254 (ex art. 191); Coppel, supra note 8, at 876 (noting that the
legal certainty argument is weakened by reforms to Article 191 (now Article 254) which now
make it obligatory for directives to be published in the Official Journal).
116. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 876. It should be noted, however, that this argument
may apply to corporations who have inside legal counsel constantly informing them of the
legality of their actions, but it does not apply as neatly to individuals who act and do not
have such counsel.
117. See van Gerven, supra note 105, at 351 (stating that "someone, who would have
been bound by an obligation imposed by a directive if that directive had been properly im-
plemented by the Member State concerned, can not take advantage of that Member State's
failure to do so, in order to deny a course of action brought against him by a person who
would have obtained legal rights against him, if the Member State's default had not occurred,
and who was entitled to act in reliance thereupon").
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ment the directive and to pass a national law making it illegal in that
Member State to drink alcohol under the age of 18 would not affect the
existence of the EC law. The fact would remain that it is illegal to drink
alcohol under the age of 18 in the European Community despite what
the national law might say. Thus, individuals in the European Commu-
nity' should be bound by this law regardless of what the national laws
are. As citizens of countries that are members of the European Commu-
nity, individuals must be cognizant not only of national laws, but also of
European Community laws. Also, just as there are national laws by
which individuals are bound, but about which they know nothing, so too,
there are European Community laws about which individuals know
nothing but by which they are bound. In this way, holding individuals
liable for a Member State's failure to implement EC law would not be
unfair, or at least would not be unjust enough to deny other individuals
the recourse they deserve.
A sixth argument that has been advanced is that horizontal direct ef-
fect would blur the distinction between regulations and directives set out
in Article 249 of the EC Treaty."8 Although it is true that the drafters of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the "EEC
Treaty") intended that there be a distinct difference between regulations
and directives, this distinction has already been blurred by subsequent
Community legislation." 9 As Betlem illustrates:
Not only do regulations frequently require action to be taken by
the domestic authorities (including the legislatures), but the
choice left for Member States in implementing certain provi-
sions of directives may not differ from a directly applicable
provision of a regulation; often they are not distinguishable in
content but only in 'form and nomenclature.' It follows that ar-
guments based on the nature of a directive cannot be decisive.'
20
In the alternative, as Betlem explains, differences between directives and
regulations would remain even after directives are made horizontally
directly effective.' 2' "Horizontal, like vertical, direct effect would only
apply under certain circumstances; that is in the event of incorrect or
118. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 487; Maltby, supra note 61, at 310; Valladares, su-
pra note 63, at 25 (discussing Advocate General Slynn's opinion in Case 152/84, Marshall v.
Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, 734, 1
C.M.L.R. 688 (1986)).
119. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 487 ("Admittedly the drafters of the EEC Treaty
originally had intended a clear distinction, but in the subsequent pattern of Community legis-
lation a firm ontological difference cannot be detected."); Coppel, supra note 8, at 877.
120. Betlem, supra note 56, at 487.
121. See id.
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non-implementation, and after the expiry of the designated period."' 2  In
other words, unlike regulations, horizontal direct effect of directives
would be contingent upon the directive either being seriously mis-
implemented or unimplemented.
Yet another argument is that if a Member State is in default, it is the
Commission's obligation to consider such default under its Article 169
(now Article 226) functions.' 23 Under Article 226, the individual may
petition the Commission to take action against a Member State for its
failure to properly implement a directive.' Considering the Court al-
lows deviation from the Article 226 procedures in the case of vertical
direct effect by allowing individuals to directly assert Community law
against a Member State where the Member State has failed to properly
implement a directive, disallowing deviation from the Article 226 pro-
cedures in the case of horizontal direct effect is inconsistent. For that
reason, this argument is severely undermined.
A eighth argument against horizontal direct effect for directives is
that the binding effect of a directive exists only against the Member
States to which it is addressed.'25 To rebut this argument, however, one
need only cite to Defrenne v. Sabena, which held that the fact that cer-
tain Treaty Articles are addressed to Member States only does not
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual
who has an interest in the performance of the duties thus laid down.' 
26
Two final arguments against horizontal direct effect are the "demo-
cratic deficit" argument and the "subsidiary principle" argument. The
"democratic deficit" argument is that the circumvention of the imple-
mentation process characteristic of horizontal direct effect makes
horizontal direct effect less than democratic.2 7 The "subsidiary princi-
ple" argument is that directives are the embodiment of subsidiarity
122. Id.
123. Under Article 226, an individual can petition the Commission to inform it of a vio-
lation of Community law by a Member State. EEC TREATY art. 226 (ex art. 169) ("If the
Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this
Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the
opportunity to submit its observations."). See Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. at 735 (Opinion of Ad-
vocate General Slynn).
124. EC TREATY art. 226 (ex art. 169).
125. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 192; Betlem, supra note 56, at 8; Val-
ladares, supra note 63, at 25 (discussing the Advocate General Slynn's opinion in Marshall,
1986 E.C.R. at 734). Craig & de Burca contend that this is not a strong argument because the
Court usually looks to the precise text of the EC Treaty simply as one factor in deciding on
the interpretation of the relevant provision. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 192.
126. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 14, at 192. See also Case 43/75, Defrenne v.
Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1976),
modified, Case 50/96, Deutsche Telekom v. Schroder, 2000 E.C.R. 1-743.
127. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 487.
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because the EC Treaty leaves it up to the Member States to implement
directives. By allowing individuals to enforce directives directly against
other individuals, we would remove the subsidiarity of directives and
therefore encroach on the sovereignty of the Member States.
The democratic deficit argument, as in many other arguments
against horizontal direct effect, can also be leveraged against vertical
direct effect because non-implementation is present in that situation as
well. As for the subsidiarity argument, it also applies equally to vertical
direct effect of directives. In addition, as Coppel argues, the subsidiarity
question has more to do with the acceptance of a directive, rather than
making it effective:
Once the decision has been taken to produce a directive, sub-
sidiarity may then dictate that the directive is worded broadly
rather than narrowly, leaving more rather than less discretion to
the Member States. However, once a directive has been adopted,
it is hard to see how subsidiarity could justify any move to make
its terms less effective at a national level. 
28
Thus, once a Member State has accepted a directive, it has necessarily
agreed to make it effective.
Although many arguments can be advanced against establishing
horizontal direct effect for directives, those arguments are rebuttable.
One of the strongest rebuttals is that many of the arguments against
horizontal direct effect, if really considered seriously, can also be used
against measures the ECJ has already implemented such as vertical di-
rect effect for directives, horizontal and vertical direct effect for Treaty
Articles, and the indirect effect doctrine.'29
B. Arguments in Favor of Horizontal Direct Effect for Directives
Along with the convincing rebuttals to arguments against horizontal
direct effect for directives, there are some additional arguments that
support horizontal direct effect for directives. For example, it simply
seems arbitrary that individuals can assert rights granted by EC law if
their employer is a Member State, but cannot do so if they work for a
private employer, especially considering that the distinction between a
private entity and a State entity has become vague. 30 Not only is it
128. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 877.
129. See id. at 878 (stating that indirect effect can result in the terms of directives being
enforced against individuals who do not have any more notice than they would under hori-
zontal direct effect).
130. See de Burca, supra note 65, at 231 (1992) (stating that the distinction between an
employee of private versus public entities is arbitrary especially since it is uncertain what is
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arbitrary, but it goes against the EC law principle of non-discrimination,
because employees of private employers are necessarily being
discriminated against relative to employees of public employers in a
world where there is vertical direct effect but no horizontal direct
effect. "'
Second, an argument advanced by Advocate General Lenz in Fac-
cini Dori is that economic competition may be distorted where a
directive has been implemented correctly in some Member States but
not in others, normally to the disadvantage of more conscientious Mem-
ber States.32 For example, if there were an EC directive regulating the
amount of trade that could be contracted for with foreign country X, and
Member State Y interprets/implements the directive more conservatively
than Member State Z, Member State Y could be at a relative economic
disadvantage. Its diplomatic relations with foreign country X could suf-
fer vis-A-vis Member State Z's diplomatic relations with foreign country
X as a result of the more restrictive trade policy. Also, the restrictive
approach may prevent the more conservative state from maximizing its
production capabilities because of the potential limitations on trade with
foreign country X, relative to Z. In this way, differing interpretations of
a directive between Member States can have negative repercussions for
Member States.
regarded as a public body or an emanation of the state); O'Keeffe, supra note 79, at 904
("Individuals could rely on a directive if suing a Member State or an emanation thereof but
not if they were suing an individual, even though the underlying problem might be identical
in both cases."); Valladares, supra note 63, at 28. In Foster, the public gas company was
considered an emanation of the state and therefore an individual could directly invoke a
Community directive as against the public gas company. Case C-188/89, Foster v. British
Gas plc, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3313, 1-3348-49, 2 C.M.L.R. 833 (1990). After cases like Foster,
which are discussed in Section 1I of this Note, the distinction between a private entity and a
State entity has become vague.
131. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 862 (citing Advocate General Lenz's Opinion in Fac-
cini Dori); cf van Gerven, supra note 105, at 349 (referring to his own Advocate General's
Opinion in Marshall, arguing that the inequality that results in giving direct effect as against
the public sector and not against the private sector is one reason for establishing horizontal
direct effect); Ward, supra note 78, 314 (1994) ("If the effect of European law is not com-
mon to all individuals in all Member States, then the idea of European law, which is based on
the rule of law and is thus rights-based, becomes nonsense."). Notably, the EC law principle
of non-discrimination is a general principle of law. General principles of law constitute a
source of EC law and are generally principles that are common to some or all of the Member
States. Anti-discrimination is one such general principle of EC law. See generally, HOR-
SPOOL, supra note 10, at 115-27.
132. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1-3339, 1 C.M.L.R.
665 (1995) (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz); Coppel, supra note 8, at 862; cf Valladares,
supra note 63, 13 (arguing that direct effect generally has "facilitated the creation of a com-
mon market by helping to remove barriers to trade, which aids in the harmonization of
national legal systems and controls anti-competitive behavior").
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Third, attaching horizontal direct effect to directives will limit the
financial consequences which Member States and public authorities cur-
rently incur, pursuant to Francovich, when the Member State has not
implemented Community law correctly. 3  If directives could be used
against individuals directly despite the Member State's failure to prop-
erly implement the directive, the individuals bound by the obligations of
the directive will carry the burden of non-compliance. Otherwise, "fre-
quent use of the Francovich liability will certainly burden the state
budget instead of burdening" such individuals.'34
Fourth, accepting the horizontal direct effect of all directives that
are clear and unconditional on their face, not just directives that are se-
riously mis-implemented or unimplemented, would alleviate part of the
current burden on national courts to interpret national law in conformity
with a directive.'35 Under the current regime, in the case where an indi-
vidual must enforce her Community rights through a directive that has
been properly implemented into national law-in other words, in the
case where direct effect is inapplicable-it is unclear whether such an
individual has been accorded the full extent of her Community rights as
intended by the drafters of the directive in question. In such a situation,
the directive may be a diluted hybrid of its original form. However, if
individuals could enforce the directives directly in their original form,
clarity would be obtained because the directives would not be subject to
the deliberations and interpretations of the Member State. 36 With this
type of horizontal direct effect, the directives could be directly applied
without the struggle of first adapting national law to the directive. This
assertion is a substantial addition to what has been addressed by this
Note up until this point because it argues that directives can be applied
directly by individuals without first giving the Member State the oppor-
tunity to implement the directive. This is a more aggressive argument
because it suggests that EC law should encroach to a greater extent on
Member State sovereignty. However, the same arguments made earlier
in this Note apply here, namely the Member State's opportunity for or
lack of implementation of European Community law does not affect the
133. See van Gerven, supra note 105, at 349-50 (referring to his own Advocate Gen-
eral's Opinion in Marshall).
134. Id. at 350.
135. See id. at 349 (referring to his own Advocate General's Opinion in Marshall, stat-
ing that the burden on national courts to interpret national law in conformity with the
directive in question "has increased now that the Court has held ... that all national law,
including rules that were enacted (long) before (and thus not meant to implement the direc-
tive concerned), must be construed in accordance with Community law").
136. Arguably, however, the directive will be interpreted by the Member State court once
it is asserted by an individual in such court. However, considering the Member State court
would look to the ECJ for interpretive assistance, this is not a compelling counter-argument.
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existence and binding nature of the EC directive. Arguably, sovereignty
is encroached upon more by the existence of the EC law than by the
Member State's lack of opportunity to implement it. Also, Member
States make the decision to relinquish a level of sovereignty when they
decide to enter the European Union. Thus, horizontal direct effect of all
directives-irrespective of attempted implementation-would be less
burdensome on national courts than the current regime, under which
directives have to be implemented into national law.'37
Finally, directives are simply less effective when they cannot be in-
voked against individuals.' The more people there are against whom
EC law can be directly enforced, the more effective it will be. As Coppel
concludes:
The only way to enable ... [a significant category of] citizens
of the European [Community] ... to give effect to their rights
under directives which remain unimplemented, or imperfectly
implemented, in their home state is to allow them to claim hori-
zontal direct effect. 1
39
Also, although the Court does need to consider judicial restraint to some
extent, it is disingenuous for the Court to use judicial restraint as an ex-
cuse to stop short of applying horizontal direct effect to directives
considering the restraint it has failed to use in its jurisprudence up to
that point. "The conclusion to be drawn is that if the Court of Justice has
been prepared to sacrifice values and principles such as legal certainty
and subsidiarity to the overall goal of effectiveness in these areas, then it
should be able to do so in respect of horizontal direct effect of directives
also."'4
Therefore, as the Court itself has implicitly acknowledged through
the measures it has taken subsequent to its refusal to apply horizontal
direct effect to directives, the Court's failure to establish horizontal di-
rect effect for directives stops short of maximizing the potency of EC
law. If the application of horizontal direct effect to directives were un-
necessary or insignificant, the Court would not have taken the steps it
took to make EC law more powerful after its decision in Marshall. It is
as. if the Court made its decision in Marshall, regretted it, could not
137. It is important to note that "outright" horizontal direct effect does make directives
and regulations almost identical, and therefore, it is probably not the best solution to the
problem of the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives discussed earlier, given the lan-
guage in the EC Treaty.
138. Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3325, 1-3340, 1 C.M.L.R.
665 (1995) (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz); Coppel, supra note 8, at 862.
139. Id. at 874.
140. Id. at 878.
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overturn it and instead took other measures to try to obtain the result of
overturning the decision.
CONCLUSION
From the inception of the doctrine of direct effect in Van Gend.&
Loos, the Court has taken steps to increase the effectiveness of EC law.
The Court broadened the principle of vertical direct effect so as to cover
decisions, regulations and Treaty Articles in addition to directives. The
Court further established horizontal direct effect for regulations, deci-
sions and Treaty Articles. However, the ECJ failed to establish
horizontal direct effect for directives. In attempting to fill gaps where
needed, the Court expanded the definition of a Member State in order to
increase the number of plaintiffs who could rely on EC law. However,
the Court's ambiguous expansion of the definition of a Member State
has done more to cause confusion, than enhance the effectiveness of EC
law.14 ' Also, the Court created indirect effect and Francovich liability.
However, even these two measures do not fully compensate for the defi-
ciency in effectiveness caused by the lack of horizontal direct effect for
directives. Due to the language used by the Court in Marleasing and the
restrictive approach taken by the Court in cases following Marleasing,
the reach of indirect effect is yet unclear. 42 Also, given the condition's
placed on Francovich liability and the questions surrounding its appli-
cability, the effectiveness of Francovich is also uncertain.
A significant number of people will not find remedies from either
direct effect or Francovich liability, and without horizontal direct effect
the only thing left to prevent them from being without recourse is the
cumbersome Article 226 procedure.' 3 Unfortunately for individuals,
this process suffers major deficiencies, which makes it all the more im-
portant that individuals get the support of horizontal direct effect.
44
141. See Betlem, supra note 56, at 486.
142. Cf Hinton, supra note 59, at 326.
143. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 874; see also EEC TREATY art. 226 (ex art. 169);
Hanft, supra note 85, at 1247 ("When a directive cannot confer a direct effect and national
law cannot be construed to give the directive its intended effect, the only recourse for an
individual or undertaking is to request that the Commission institute an Article 169 proceed-
ing.").
144. See Kurt Riechenberg, Local Administration and the Binding Nature of Commu-
nity Directives: A Lesser Known Side of European Legal Integration, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.
J. 696, 712 (1999) ("There is general recognition that the infringement procedure under Arti-
cle 169 of the EC Treaty is not a particularly efficient instrument to control the respect of
Community law by Member States"); Valladares, supra note 63, at 9-12 (stating that not
only does the Article 169 (now Article 226) procedure lack enforcement power, but also thai
the Commission is overloaded with work, and political reasons often prevent it from initiat-
ing proceedings against offending Member States).
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"Because of the deficiencies of the Article 226 process, the develop-
ments regarding the direct effect of Directives in national law are
extremely important."' 4 5 The Court has stopped short of truly making EC
law powerful by failing to give individuals the requisite tools to bring
suit under EC Treaty directives against other individuals.
46
Many reasons have been advanced by the Court and others to ex-
plain or justify its decision to deny horizontal direct effect for directives.
Most of these arguments do not stand up to counter-arguments which
illustrate that if the same reasoning were applied to the doctrines of in-
direct effect or Francovich liability, for example, those doctrines; too,
should not have been implemented. Also, the acceptance of such argu-
ments suggests that there could be no means to apply vertical direct
effect to directives, which the court has in fact managed to do. The rea-
sons advanced against the establishment of horizontal direct effect for
directives cannot overcome the argument that horizontal direct effect for
directives is necessary to achieve the Court's goal of maximum effec-
tiveness of EC law. Therefore, the only plausible conclusion is that
horizontal direct effect for directives should be established immediately!
145. Theis, supra note 35, at 168.
146. See Coppel, supra note 8, at 874.
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